Daniel O'Shiel

This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on dualism, whether they were apparent proponents (Descartes), opponents (Spinoza), or had a somewhat ambiguous status (Sartre), were also heavily involved in understanding emotion. Ultimately, a proper comprehension of emotion shows the issue of dualism to be moot when it comes to our pre-reflective, everyday lives; dualism is a theoretical interest that shows how we must necessarily posit two essential realms-one of nature and one of consciousness-that are nevertheless always already entwined in pre-reflective and immediately lived experiences like emotion. In this manner, a proper understanding of emotion shows that dualism is not an issue on the everyday lived level, but certainly is on epistemological and metaphysical ones. On these levels, dualism is an essential tool that must be understood and used properly if one is to give a thoroughgoing account of human nature from a theoretical standpoint, where avoiding conflations between immediate and reflective experiences, as well as first-person and third-person standpoints, is crucial. Here, one needs to be aware not only of our dual nature of matter and mind, but also of our dual-which is to say scientific and phenomenological ways-of tackling theoretical problems. In short, one may give a proper, dynamic account of human emotion and simultaneously recognize the advantage of thinking in dual-but not "dualistic"-registers.

This paper contrasts Sartre's account of emotion with Heidegger's account of Befindlichkeit and 'mood' (Stimmung). Sartre's account of emotion is a strong one: emotions occur only when a more neutral and colourless 'pragmatic attitude' is frustrated or breaks down. In this manner, emotion has to be acutely felt in and through the body, which also means that there are many circumstances and states in which we do not undergo any emotion at all. In fact, Sartre's 'pragmatic attitude' is precisely the mode in which we simply go about our business in an emotionless manner. This raises the question as to whether Sartre's stark opposition between emotional and non-emotional experiences actually holds. I believe Heidegger's account of Befindlichkeit and its moods are key in this regard, in that it can be used to nuance the Sartrean account. Indeed, Heidegger famously states that Dasein is never unattuned. In fact, precisely because of the ontological structure of Befindlichkeit, the world always already matters to us in one way or another, with moods being one of our primary ways of experiencing what matters and why. This discussion therefore aims to yield an account whereby faint moods (Heidegger) and strong emotions (Sartre) form two poles of the same dynamic. To use a metaphor, moods are the tectonic plates that make the various emotional shakes and quakes possible in any given situation. Finally, I finish with some possible remaining tensions between the two thinkers, as well as a way to look for a possible solution.

Sartre’s conception of ‘‘the look’’ creates an ontological conflict with no
real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as believing too much in some deep ‘‘I’’ or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of
the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets ‘‘magically’’ reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable ‘‘I’’; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of (inter)personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better (through the look), with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core.

By introducing ‘drives’ into a Sartrean framework,
‘being-in-itself’ is interpreted as ‘Nature as such’, wherein instincts
dominate. Being-for-itself, on the contrary, has an ontological nature
diametrically opposed to this former – indeed, in the latter realm,
through a fundamental process of ‘nihilation’ (Sartre’s ‘freedom’)
consciousness perpetually fl ees itself by transcending towards the
world. However, a kernel of (our) nihilated Nature is left at the heart
of this process, in the form of ‘original facticity’ that we here name
drives. Drives are the original feelings and urges of a freed Nature that
simply are there; they are the fundamental forces that consciousness
qua freedom always has to deal with. Drives, in addition, can be
nihilated in their own turn, onto a refl ective, irreal plane, whereby
they take the form of value. This means Sartre’s notion of ontological
desire is always made up of two necessary components: drives and
value.

Sartrean conceptions of the Ego, emotions, language, and the imaginary provide a comprehensive account of "magic" that could ultimately give rise to a new philosophical psychology. By focusing upon only one of these here-the imaginary-we see that through its irrealizing capabilities consciousness contaminates the world and bewitches itself in a manner that defies simple determinis-tic explication. We highlight this with an explication of what Sartre means by "nihilation" and the "analogon," and introduce a concrete example of nostalgia, hoping to lay the scene for a detailed study into the dynamic between our ontological freedom and its constitution and experience of phenomena as enchanting and bewitching. "Magical being" must therefore involve a deep, Sartrean analysis that explicates ontological freedom as becoming concretely engaged in both the real and irreal alike, whereby the imaginary as magic can lead to the most insane, as well as the most artistic, incantations.

This piece explicates some chief modes of consciousness in phenomenology in order to show that a very significant challenge of virtuality surfaces both within, as well as outside of, the discipline. This issue is of no small importance today, where the difference between perception and imagination, real and irreal, as well as presence and absence, are all becoming increasingly vague because of new technologies and the intrinsic virtualities involved therein. In this context, the question is: Where does virtuality fit in such a picture? I will argue that phenomenology can start to account for such developments, although much more explicative work will be required in the future. With this in mind, sections two to four will articulate an initial phenomenology of perception, phantasy, and image-consciousness, as found chiefly in works by Husserl and Sartre. Then, section five will question the preceding phenomenological theory through some phenomenological (Heidegger) and non-phenomenological (Bergson and Deleuze) thinkers, who all seem to have a concept of virtuality at the heart of their work. Lastly, in the final two sections I will suggest a difference between real and irreal virtualities, and briefly mention some current virtual technologies in order to show that there is a constant and complex interplay between the real, irreal, and the virtual in many of our everyday experiences—an interplay that needs to be investigated much further if we are to make sense of how it is changing how we think and behave.

Jean-Paul Sartre's technical and multifaceted concept of magic is central for understanding crucial elements of his early philosophy (1936-1943), not least his conception of the ego, emotion, the imaginary and value. Daniel O'Shiel follows the thread of magic throughout Sartre's early philosophical work. Firstly, Sartre's work on the ego (1936) shows a personal, reflective form of consciousness that is magically hypostasized onto the pre-reflective level. Secondly, emotion (1938) is inherently magical for Sartre because emotive qualities come to inhere in objects and thereby transform a world of pragmatism into one of captivation. Thirdly, analyses of The Imaginary (1940) reveal that anything we imagine is a spontaneous creation of consciousness that has the power to enchant and immerse us, even to the point of images holding sway over us. Culminating with Sartre's ontological system of Being and Nothingness (1943), O'Shiel argues that Sartre does not do away with the concept, but in fact provides ontological roots for it. This is most evident in Sartre's analyses of value, possession and language. A second part shows how such Sartrean magic is highly relevant for a number of concrete case studies: the arts, advertising, racism and stupidity, and certain instances of psychopathology. O'Shiel shows that Sartre's magical being is important for any contemporary philosophical anthropology because it is essentially at work at the heart of many of our most significant experiences, both creative and damaging.